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Book Review 
Drew Dalton, The Ethics of Resistance: Tyranny of the 
Absolute (London, U.K.: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 
pp. 154.  
To echo the sentiments of Len Lawlor in his 2006 review of John Russon’s 
Human Experience, Drew Dalton’s The Ethics of Resistance: Tyranny of the 
Absolute is a book that I wish I had written. This text is a rigorous, articulate, 
and exceptionally clear development of a unique and original ethical position. 
In brief, his position is this: evil, rather than a lack or privation, is instead the 
result of blind devotion to some absolute value, entity, or concept. Rather than 
dismiss the idea of an absolute altogether, Dalton argues for the existence of 
the absolute in the form of the Other (via Levinas) but that this absolute must 
be resisted (rather than embraced). This position is articulated by bringing a 
dizzying number of philosophers into dialogue: Immanuel Kant, Alain 
Badiou, Quentin Meillassoux, Emmanuel Levinas, Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, F.W.J. Schelling, Soren Kierkegaard, Jacques Lacan, Michel 
Foucault, Hannah Arendt, J.S. Mill, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and 
Heraclitus. It is for these reasons that I highly recommend The Ethics of 
Resistance to both novices and scholars interested in ethics, phenomenology, 
and contemporary French philosophy.  
The main subject of Dalton’s text is the problem of evil. For Dalton, the 
history of Western European ethics has treated evil as “a moral failure,” 
privation, or lack (1). As such, evil has been “defined not as a moral force in 
its own right, but as the perversion, rejection, or negation of the moral force 
of the absolute” (1). That is, if we know the absolute good, then we cannot 
help but be good ourselves. On this view, evil is the result of the failure to 
know or follow this absolute good. Yet, this cannot be the case. How much 
evil has resulted from a fervent devotion to some seemingly absolute good? 
Thus, in an echo of Schopenhauer, Dalton argues that evil is rather a positive 
force, and the inevitable result of devotion to some absolute value, concept, 
or entity. 
Dalton uses this view of evil to tie a massive array of phenomena 
together, such as the North Atlantic slave trade, the Armenian genocide, the 
Shoah, Srebrenica (2), Operation Iraqi Freedom (14), consumerism (56), the 
problem of Abraham (60), child soldiers, the Jonestown Massacre, the Solar 
Temple, Aum Shinrikyo, plantation owners, the “great white burden” (64), 
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Adolf Eichmann (65), neurosis and psychosis (85), tsarist pogroms, the two 
World Wars, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Alt-Right, Men’s 
Rights Movements, the election of Donald Trump, BREXIT, the rise of 
European white nationalism in the form of groups like UKIP or Vlaams 
Belaang, and Silicon Valley utopianism (107). For Dalton,  
What each of these instances of evil has in common is the 
same attempt to realize on earth the complete order of an 
absolute idea of infinite perfection (e.g. the ideal society, the 
perfect race, a totally secure homeland) – some idea of an 
absolutely perfect good which, by virtue of its status, is 
capable of demanding the complete sacrifice of not only the 
life of the obedient subject, but the life of others as well. (56) 
That is, people often commit evil acts through an attachment to some idea that 
they take to be an absolute good – a good which, they think, requires sacrifice. 
It is in the name of this absolute (e.g. God or blood purity) that evil acts are 
committed. Thus, Dalton argues, evil is not the result of some moral lack or 
failure, but the result of blind devotion to some absolute. 
In light of this, Dalton argues that absolutes must be resisted, and thus 
recasts ethics as a “constant and thoughtful resistance to the power of the 
absolute” (111). It might seem like Dalton would advocate for the dissolution 
of absolutes altogether, but he takes another route. Rather than arguing for an 
ethics in light of the death of God, Dalton argues that we are surrounded by 
a “proliferation of absolutes” within our contemporary society and that we 
must learn how to resist their allure (108). He argues that his formulation of 
ethics as a form of resistance serves to recast how philosophers understand 
the project of ethics as such, in the form of the following question: “How are 
we to deal with the panoply of competing absolutes present in contemporary 
discourse when each of them summons us with a demand calling for our 
complete and total allegiance?” (108). Thus, ethics is not the pursuit of the 
absolute, but resistance to it.  
That Dalton makes this argument in a shorter text, and that he makes 
such traditionally difficult thinkers digestible (such as Badiou or Lacan) to 
people who might not be familiar with them, is remarkable. The text itself is 
structured excellently and meticulously researched. The first half of the book 
articulates the basic problem with contemporary ethics (and its 
understanding of evil) so as to ground the possibility of a new kind of ethical 
theory on the basis of the phenomenology of Levinas. The second half of the 
book outlines what an ethics of resistance might look like through an 
examination of the work of Lacan and Foucault. Let us now take a brief tour 
through Dalton’s text, but broad and cartoon-like strokes that will in no sense 
do justice to the way in which he navigates the complexity of these thinkers 
and ideas. 
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The first chapter works to show a dilemma inherent within post-Kantian 
ethical systems. After Kant, for Dalton, “[t]there is no longer any universally 
shared God to whom we can turn for guidance, nor is there any obviously 
actualizable noumenal realm of ideas or forms from which we can deduce 
determinate action” (11). This results in a difficult choice: “either give up on 
ethical absolutes entirely by embracing some form of ethical relativism or 
nihilism… or… attempt to establish some new non-absolute ground for 
ethical acquiescence and judgment” (11). Ultimately, neither horn is 
productive. Liberalism and Nationalism represent, for Dalton, forms of ethical 
dogmatism and ethical relativism (respectively) that both end in evil (e.g. 
colonialism and the project of Western Liberalism). However, the second horn 
of the dilemma does not work either, which Dalton shows through a 
convincing critique of both Badiou and Meillassoux’s respective attempts to 
anchor ethics in a non-absolute ground. On the one hand, Badiou’s idea of 
fidelity to the event ends up in a form of fanaticism (as illustrated by the 
suicide bomber). On the other hand, Meillassoux’s theory devolves into a 
form of eschatology, in which “ethical action consists for him in nothing more 
than a hope for what he calls ‘a world to come’” which forecloses the actual 
possibility of justice in this world (24). 
The second chapter argues for the possibility of a universal and actual 
absolute ground in the phenomenology of Levinas. The chapter begins with a 
deft and rigorous defense of phenomenology against the charge of 
correlationism as found in contemporary speculative philosophy. Dalton 
argues that this charge is not particularly new, but can be found within the 
work of Frege, and, as Dalton rightly shows, Husserl took Frege’s initial 
criticisms of psychologism seriously, and developed the phenomenological 
project as a critique of both psychologism and naturalism. This, however, is a 
set-up for Dalton to make use of Levinas, within whom Dalton locates the 
possibility for a universal and actual absolute ground for ethical judgment, 
i.e. the Other. 
However, as Dalton argues in the third chapter, Levinas’ account is 
ultimately problematic and must be offset by Schelling’s insistence on the 
reversibility of good and evil. According to Dalton, Levinas’ Other has a kind 
of absolute power over us – a power “that cannot be shirked nor evaded (47). 
The fear, for Dalton, is that “the power possessed by this absolute appears 
capable of captivating the subject completely, becoming a tyrant who 
threatens to destroy the very existence and freedom which it founds and 
justifies” (50). To make this case, Dalton turns to the work of Schelling, who 
recognized the “possibility that any attempt to achieve the good might 
actually result in evil” (53). Dalton writes that, for Schelling, “any action 
established in affirmation of the absolute… runs the risk of reverting into evil, 
however well-intentioned it may be” (54). Thus, through Schelling, Dalton 
concludes that while we must affirm the existence of a universal and actual 
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absolute ground in the Other, this absolute must not be embraced, but instead 
resisted. 
Parts One and Two are divided by an interlude, in which Dalton 
illustrates the way in which the absolute can have a tyrannical effect. The first 
example is that of Kierkegaard’s famous defense of Abraham, which Dalton 
rejects outright. For Dalton, Abraham is willing to commit evil because of a 
blind devotion to God. Similarly, he argues that the atrocities committed by 
Adolf Eichmann were the result of the latter’s devotion to the absolutes of the 
Nazi party. 
The fourth and fifth chapters outline an ethics of resistance in light of the 
analyses given in Part One of the text. In this regard, Dalton leans on the work 
of Lacan and Foucault to locate a two-part structure of resistance. Lacan 
provides “a model of demonic resistance which, while acknowledging the 
power of the absolute in the Other, refuses to affirm it as a good,” in the form 
of a no-saying (88). Foucault, in turn, provides for us a way to understand 
how we can cultivate this resistance within ourselves through his late 
analyses of the care of the self. Here, Dalton analyses a number of techniques 
that Foucault gives in late lectures. 
The book ends with the development of what Dalton calls “ab-archy,” 
which he proposes as an alternative to political theories of anarchy. Rather 
than the dissolution of some arche, Dalton instead tells us that the aim of an 
ethics of resistance is to “carve a space of freedom away from (ab) the ethical 
bondage with which the absolute holds us” (119). An ethics of resistance is, 
ultimately, a “saying ‘no’ to the Other and learning to protect and care for the 
self such that we are not led by the neck of our subjectivity, jerked around via 
our shame and desire, and carried into the excess of nihilism or fanaticism 
from which springs practical political evil” (120). 
Perhaps the only limitation of Dalton’s text is that it lacks a clear 
theoretical definition of what he means by the “absolute.” This is not a deal-
breaker, since, given what he tells us, I think we can infer that the absolute is 
any kind of value, concept, or entity that is taken to hold supreme or absolute 
authority over us. But, because he does not theoretically define the term, two 
minor questions arise from his analysis. First, what is the status of an ethical 
imperative in the form of a negative? It is based on some absolute? For 
example, what are we to make of the statement that slavery is always wrong? 
I think it is at least conceivable to see this as a negative absolute. Or is this 
negative merely the inverse of some positive absolute that I am not 
acknowledging? In any case, am I to resist the imperative against slavery? 
What would a dogmatic attachment to this imperative look like, such that it 
must be resisted? This brings me to the second uncertainty, which like the 
first, arises from a lack of theoretical definition for the absolute. Dalton seems 
to claim that his ethics of resistance is the only way for us to overcome our 
current situation (120). Should this be resisted? What does a self-reflexive 
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ethics of resistance look like? Does it make sense to think about ethically 
resisting an ethics of resistance? These questions are not meant to be 
rhetorical, but instead point to ambiguities left open by the text that can be 
cleared up with a concise definition of the absolute.  
In any case, I highly recommend The Ethics of Resistance to both novices 
and scholars interested in ethics, phenomenology, and contemporary French 
philosophy. It presents a genuinely original philosophical position through 
rigorous, clear, and meticulous analyses, that, I think, must be reckoned with. 
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